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The  practice  of  guaranteeing  future  credit  avail- 
ability  to  business  enterprises,  or  what  is  today 
called  the  making  of  loan  commitments,  has  existed 
since  the  beginning  of  banking  in  the  United  States. 
Although  the  specific  forms  of  such  practices  have 
changed  considerably  in  the  past  two  hundred  years, 
the  basic  concept  has  nonetheless  been  ubiquitous 
from  post-Revolutionary  times  until  the  present. 
Banks  originally  extended  loan  commitments  only  to 
commercial  and  industrial  businesses,  but  today  they 
also  routinely  extend  such  guarantees  to  financial 
businesses  and  individuals.  Commitments  to  non- 
financial  businesses  have  retained  their  traditionally 
prominent  position,  however,  and  now  represent  ap- 
proximately  three-quarters  of  the  dollar  volume  of 
total  loan  commitments. 
It  has  only  been  since  the  mid-1960’s  that  the  topic 
of  commercial  bank  loan  commitment  policies  has 
become  an  explicit  issue  in  banking  circles.  Increas- 
ing  interest  in  these  policies  has  recently  been  ex- 
pressed  by  the  various  groups  concerned  with  the 
banking  industry,  including  bank  regulators,  students 
of  monetary  policy  and,  of  course,  bankers  them- 
selves.  This  increased  interest  is  centered  on  com- 
mitment  policies  involving  credit  guarantees  for  non- 
financial  businesses,  and  this  article  has  the  same 
focus.  Two  recent  developments  have  caused  the 
increased  attention  being  given  bank-business  loan 
commitments.  First,  the  demand  for  such  commit- 
ments  by  business  seems  to  have  enlarged  consider- 
ably.  Second,  banks  have  become  more  willing  and 
able  suppliers  of  loan  commitments,  and  their  liberal- 
ized  approach  has  led  to  concern  about  the  potential 
effects  that  vastly  increased  commitment  positions 
might  have  on  the  liquidity,  and  thus  the  soundness, 
of  individual  institutions.  These  developments  have 
also  resulted  in  an  increased  awareness  of  the  impact 
of  loan  commitments  on  the  magnitude  and  direction 
of  credit  market  flows.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that 
the  topic  of  commercial  bank  loan  commitment  poli- 
cies  has  emerged,  after  many  years  of  quiescence,  as 
one  of  the  more  important  issues  in  contemporary 
banking.1 
1 For  an  example  of  how  the  loan  commitments  issue  is  viewed  by 
regulatory  officials,  see  Arthur  F.  Burns.  “Maintaining  the  Sound- 
ness  of  Our  Banking  System,”  an  address  before  the  1974  American 
Bankers  Association  Convention,  October  21,  1974,  reprinted  in  the 
Monthly  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  Vol.  56,  No. 
11,  November  1974,  263-7. 
Even  though  recognition  of  the  importance  of  bank 
loan  commitment  policies  is  currently  widespread, 
the  reasons  for  this  change  in  status  have  not  been 
fully  explored:  there  has  been  no  formal  attempt  to 
explain  why  businesses  are  now  especially  eager  to 
obtain  guarantees  of  future  credit  availability  or  why 
the  banking  system  is  so  willing  to  satisfy  these 
demands.  The  lack  of  such  an  analysis  should  not  be 
considered  unusual,  however,  for  the  entire  evolu- 
tionary  process  leading  up  to  the  current  situation 
remains  somewhat  unclear.  The  body  of  literature 
explicitly  dealing  with  commercial  bank  loan  com- 
mitment  policies  is  relatively  new,  and  its  orientation 
has  been  practical,  not  analytical.  This  article  at- 
tempts  to  fill  the  analytical  gap  by  tracing  the  his- 
torical  development  of  commercial  bank  loan  com- 
mitment  policies  from  the  early  days  of  banking 
through  the  present. 
To  study  the  development  of  bank  loan  commit- 
ment  policies  is,  essentially,  to  study  the  development 
of  the  commercial  loan,  for  the  use  of  loan  commit- 
ments  is  simply  a  refinement  of  the  process  by  which 
credit  is  advanced  from  lender  to  borrower.  This 
article  shows  that  the  evolutionary  process  has  been 
motivated  by  changes  in  business  credit  requirements 
under  different  economic  and  financial  circumstances 
and  that  the  banking  system’s  response  has  been 
guided  by  prevailing  theories  of  proper  banking  con- 
duct.  Accordingly,  loan  commitments  are  examined 
within  the  framework  of  the  various  liquidity  theories 
that  have  guided  banking  practices  in  the  United 
States.  The  hypothesis  is  developed  that  today’s 
financial  environment  encourages  the  demand  for 
loan  commitments  by  business  because  of  recent 
experiences  with  credit  stringency.  Further,  the 
liabilities  management  conception  of  banking  doc- 
trine  allows  banks  to  satisfy  this  demand  without 
doing  violence  to  their  professional  code  of  conduct. 
The  first  section  of  the  article  provides  introductory 
descriptive  background  and  definitions  about  current- 
day  loan  commitment  practices,  and  the  second  sec- 
tion  develops  the  historical  review.  The  final  section 
summarizes  the  major  conclusions  reached. 
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Agreements  reached  between  borrower  and  lender 
with  the  purpose  of  establishing  guarantees  of  future 
credit  availability  are  referred  to  as  loan  commitment 
arrangements.  The  current  trend  in  commercial  lend- 
ing  is  to  structure  loans  and  loan  commitments  to  fit 
individual  borrower  needs,  not  to  force  all  trans- 
actions  into  preconceived  patterns.  Although  this 
makes  it  difficult  to  distinguish  sharply  among  the 
various  forms  that  loan  commitments  take,  there  are 
certain  basic  patterns  to  which  these  arrangements 
conform.  These  basic  patterns  are  classified  here 
according  to  the  maturity  of  the  intended  advance, 
for  maturity  is  a  good  indicator  of  the  use  to  which 
funds  are  put.  Short-term  loans  are  made  for  sea- 
sonal  and  transaction  needs,  intermediate-term  loans 
for  working  capital  needs  and  interim  financing,  and 
long-term  loans  for  investment  in  fixed  assets.  Bor- 
rower  demands  for  loan  commitments  reflect  these 
specific  types  of  capital  requirements. 
One  other  important  distinction  is  between  com- 
mitment  arrangements  that  are  legally  enforceable 
and  those  that  are  not.  The  majority  of arrangements 
are  made  between  banks  and  their  customers  on  an 
informal  basis,  either  verbally  or  in  correspondence. 
In  cases  where  an  unequivocal  guarantee  is  desired, 
however,  legal  documentation  is  prepared.  Com- 
mitment  arrangements  legally  binding  to  the  bank  are 
almost  always  accompanied  by  a  fee  that  is  typically 
computed  on  a  daily  basis  against  the  unused  portion 
of  the  commitment.  These  fees  are  justified  on  the 
grounds  that  legally  binding  commitment  arrange- 
ments  place  the  bank  in  a  position  from  which  it 
must  be  prepared  to  advance  funds  without  recourse. 
For  the  same  reason  it  is  common  practice  for  the 
fee  to  be  retained  even  if  the  customer  does  not 
utilize  his  commitment.2  As  a practical  matter,  how- 
ever,  loan  commitments  backed  by  the  moral  obliga- 
tion  of  a  bank  are  honored  with  the  same  degree  of 
seriousness  as  those  backed  by  a  legal  obligation, 
because  failure  to  meet  commitments  for  reasons 
other  than  cause  would  destroy  a  bank’s  credibility 
in  the  financial  community.  Any  commitment  dis- 
closed  to  the  customer,  therefore,  has  the  status  of  a 
serious  obligation  to  be  honored  by  a  bank  if  at  all 
possible.  The  equal  status  given  all  types  of  disclosed 
commitments  is  reflected  in  a  survey  of  eight  large 
Midwestern  banks,  which  found  uniform  satisfaction 
of  all  commitments  during  the  1969-1970  period  of 
tight  money.3 
Commitments  for  Short-Term  Uses  Bank  loan 
commitments  to  business  firms  that  have  an  intended 
short-term  use  for  credit  take  the  form  of  a  line  of 
credit.  Lines  of  credit,  which  account  for  most  of  the 
volume  of  loan  commitments,  are  classified  into  two 
types:  the  open  line  of  credit  and  the  firm  line  of 
credit.  The  open  line  of  credit  is  very  informal  in 
nature,  usually  taking  the  form  of  a  letter  from  the 
bank  stating  a  general  willingness  to  lend  funds  up 
to  some  maximum  limit  over  a specific  period  of time, 
generally  not  more  than  one  year  in  length.  The 
commitment  letter  does  not  specify  the  terms  of  the 
arrangement,  which  the  bank  may  change  while  the 
letter  is  outstanding.  The  customer  may  borrow 
under  the  open  line  of  credit  at  his  discretion,  with 
interest  being  charged  only  on  the  actual  amount  of 
credit  he  uses.  Continuous  borrowing  under  open 
lines  of credit  is  discouraged,  and  most  banks  require 
that  their  lines  be  “cleaned  up”  (the  level  of  bor- 
rowing  must  return  to  zero)  at  some  time  during  the 
year.  This  tradition  reinforces  the  intention  that 
credits  granted  under  open  lines  are  for  short-term 
uses  only.  The  fact  that  advances  under  open  lines 
of  credit  are  treated  the  same  way  as  are  direct 
short-term  borrowings,  always  being  accompanied  by 
the  customer’s  promissory  note,  further  emphasizes 
this  intention.  In  return  for  an  open  line  of  credit, 
the  customer  is  required  to  pay  an  implicit  fee  in  the 
form  of  compensating  demand  deposit  balances. 
A  firm  line  of  credit  closely  resembles  an  open 
line  with  the  exception  that a  fee  is  paid  based  on  the 
unused  portion  of  the  arrangement.  It  thus  has  legal 
status  but  in  terms  of  service  rendered  offers  the 
customer  nothing  more  than  an  open  line  of  credit. 
Commitments  for  Intermediate-Term  Uses  The 
revolving  credit  is  a  device  that  has  come  into  use  in 
response  to  needs  for  short-term  but  continuous 
credit  or  for  credit  of  uncertain  duration.  It  guar- 
antees  the  customer  use  of  fluctuating  amounts  of 
bank  credit  over  an  extended  period  of  time,  usually 
two  or  three  years,  and  has  legal  status.  An  explicit 
fee  based  on  the  unused  portion  of  the  commitment 
is  always  involved,  and  recently  a  number  of  banks 
have  instituted  an  additional  charge  based  on  the 
2 Eli  S.  Silberfeld,  “Loan  Commitment  Fees-Some  Legal  Points,” 
The Journal  of  Commercial  Bank  Lending,  Vol.  56,  No.  6,  February 
1974, 65. 
3 Douglas  A.  Hayes,  Bank  Lending  Policies:  Domestic  and  Inter- 
national,  Michigan  Business  Series,  Vol.  XVIII,  No.  4,  The  Univer- 
sity  of  Michigan,  1971,  p.  79. 
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monly  charged  on  the  unused  portion  is  one-half  of 
one  percent  per  annum,  while  that  levied  on  the 
entire  commitment  is  one-quarter  of  one  percent  per 
annum.  Compensating  balances  are  also  required. 
Given  the  formal  character  of  revolving  credit 
arrangements,  a  rate  charged  on  borrowing  under 
commitment  is  specified.  The  rate  usually  has  a 
fixed  relation  to  the  prevailing  prime  rate,  and  in 
this  way  the  bank  is  assured  of  a  return  that  is  real- 
istically  related  to  existing  credit  market  conditions. 
The  customer’s  borrowing  privilege  depends  upon 
his  ability  to  meet  certain  financial  conditions  speci- 
fied  in  a  set  of  protective  covenants  contained  in  the 
contract,  a  feature  designed  to  protect  the  bank  from 
adverse  changes  in  credit  risk. 
Commitments  for  Long-Term  Uses  Business 
credit  needs  related  to  the  acquisition  of  fixed  assets 
can  sometimes  be  satisfied  using  bank  term  loans 
that  have  a  maximum  maturity  of  about  ten  years. 
Term  loans  represent  a popular  type  of debt  financing 
for  moderately-sized  companies  that  do  not  have 
access  to  public  credit  markets  and  for  larger  cor- 
porations  that  may  find  bank  credit  terms  more 
flexible  than  either  public  debt  issues  or  equity  fi- 
nancing.  When  made  directly,  term  loan  commitment 
arrangements  obligate  the  bank  to  extend  up  to  a 
specified  maximum  amount  of  credit  upon  request, 
provided  the  customer  meets  certain  financial  re- 
quirements  contained  in  the  contract.  Funds  can 
be  taken  down  as  needed  or  the  entire  amount  can 
be  obtained  at  one  time,  but  either  way  a  long-term 
promissory  note  is  made  out.  A  fee  is  charged  based 
on  the  unused  portion  of  the  commitment  over  its 
life.  The  volume  of  direct  term  loan  commitments 
is  not  large  relative  to  other  types  of  loan  commit- 
ments. 
Often  revolving  credits  are  supplemented  with  a 
term  loan  option  that  allows  the  customer  to  convert 
the  unused  portion  of  his  commitment  into  a  term 
loan  at  the  arrangement’s  expiration.  The  revolving 
credit  with  a  term  loan  option  is  a  very  flexible 
arrangement  that  appeals  to  businesses  engaged  in 
projects  that  take  several  years  to  complete.  The 
revolving  credit  feature  of  the  contract  provides 
“bridge”  financing  that  can  be  activated  as  necessary, 
while  the  term  loan  feature  provides  an  optional 
source  of  long-term  financing,  should  conditions  in 
the  bond  or  equity  markets  prove  unfavorable  at  the 
time  a  project  is  completed. 
’  “Citibank  Increases  Loan-Pledge  Fees  Charged  Big  Firms,”  Wo,U 
Stmct  Journal,  September  24,  1974, D.  29,  and  Ben  Weherman, 
“Holland  Says  Credit  Line  Commitment  Prices  Should be More  Than 
Doubled.”  Anwrican  Banker,  November  12.  1974,  p.  1. 
Loan  Commitment  Policies  and  Theories 
of  Bank  liquidity 
The  Commercial  Loan  Theory  of  Credit  The 
first  theory  to govern  banking  practices  in the  United 
States  was  imported  from  Great  Britain,  for  in  this 
matter,  as  in  so  many  others,  early  American  thought 
was  strongly  influenced  by  prevailing  opinion  in  the 
mother  country.  Thus  the  real-bills  doctrine,  a  most 
persistent  and  popular  British  conception  of  proper 
banking  conduct,  came  to  play  a key  role  in  the  early 
development  of  U.  S.  banking  theory  and  practice. 
The  real-bills  doctrine  assumed  form  in  18th  cen- 
tury  British  banking  circles,  where  an  oral  tradition 
grew  up  regarding  its  various  aspects.  Adam  Smith 
provided  the  first  systematic  exposition  of  the  doc- 
trine  in his  Wealth  of h’ations  (1776))  and  thereafter 
many  writers  contributed  to  its  refinement.  During 
the  19th  century,  a  turbulent  formative  period  for 
U.  S.  banking  practices  and  legislation,  it  was  the 
focal  point  of  debate  and  discussion  in  British  bank- 
ing.  For  the  British  banking  school,  the  real-bills 
doctrine  represented  a  central  thesis,  and  its  rele- 
vance  to  both  banking  and  monetary  management 
was  stressedP  Basically  a  theory  of  asset  manage- 
ment  that  emphasized  liquidity,  the  doctrine  held 
that  banks  should  restrict  their  earning  assets  to 
“real”  bills  of  exchange  (discounted  paper  financing 
the  movement  of  goods)  and  short-term,  self-liqui- 
dating  advances  for  commercial  purposes.  In  this 
way,  it  was  argued,  individual  banking  institutions 
could  maintain  the  liquidity  necessary  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  deposit  withdrawals  on  demand. 
Under  a  somewhat  modified  character  this  basic 
doctrine  came  to  be  known  in  the  U.  S.  as  the  com- 
mercial  loan  theory  of  credit,  and  it  remained  the 
rubric  of  banking  until  the  1920’s. 
For  about  the  first  fifty  years  of  U.  S.  banking 
history,  the  commercial  loan  theory  of  credit  was 
easily  compatible  with  practical  standards  of  conduct, 
which  were  quite  primitive.  The  development  of 
commercial  banking  in  this  country  had  a  very  slow 
beginning,  due  largely  to  the  limited  demands  and 
special  preferences  of  the  colonists  for  credit.  In 
Colonial  times,  of  course,  the  economy  was  largely 
agrarian,  and  a  flourishing  manufacturing  industry 
with  heavy  capital  demands  simply  did  not  exist. 
Given  the  relatively  backward  state  of  the  economy, 
therefore,  aggregate  credit  demand  was  not  large. 
Existing  requirements  for  financial  assistance  were 
5 With  respect  to  monetaw  management,  it  was  argued  that  adher- 
ence to  the  real-bills  doctrine would cause aggregate  liabilities of  the 
banking  system  (notes  and  demand  deposits)  to  vary  in  quantity 
according to  the state  of  real  economic  activity.  In  effect.  then,  the 
money  supply  would  always  he  maintained  at  the  most  desirable 
level in  a  virtually  self-regulated  manner. 
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chants),  Colonial  governments,  and  colonizing  com- 
panies.  English  banks  also  counted  as  important 
sources  of  credit  for  Colonial  enterprise.  In  short, 
important  banking  functions  were  performed  without 
the  aid  of  domestic  banks,  and  this  combination  of 
circumstances  acted  to  retard  the  development  of  a 
commercial  banking  industry.  It  was  not  until  after 
the  Revolutionary  War  that  the  first  bank  in  this 
country,  the  Bank  of  North  America,  was  established 
in  1782  in  Philadelphia. 
Merchants  formed  the  Bank  of  North  America,  as 
they  did  most  other  early  banks,  in  order  to  make 
credit  more  conveniently  available  for  financing  trade. 
The  loans  of  these  early  banks  were  of  a  self-liqui- 
dating  nature,  and  they  conformed  to  the  appropriate 
type  of  asset  prescribed  by  the  commercial  loan 
theory  of  banking.  Also,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  banks  customarily  entered  into  informal  loan 
commitment  arrangements  with  businesses  requiring 
funds  for  actual  short-term  purposes.  This  happy 
situation  did  not  prevail  for  long,  however.  In  the 
second  quarter  of  the  19th  century,  the  U.  S.  entered 
a  period  of  sustained  and  vigorous  economic  growth. 
This  process  required  large  amounts  of  capital, 
especially  of  a  long-term  nature,  and  these  demands 
were  partly  directed  toward  the  banking  system. 
Consequently,  banks  were  confronted  with  the  prob- 
lem  of  meeting  credit  demands  directly  at  variance 
with  their  accepted  code  of  conduct,  which  empha- 
sized  short-term  lending. 
Without  doubt  commercial  banks  did  satisfy  these 
demands  for  longer-term  credit,  including  those  asso- 
ciated  with  fixed  investment  programs.  Yet  it  is 
also  true  that,  in  form  at  least,  a  facade  of  short-term 
lending  was  maintained.  This  occurred  as  the  bill 
of  exchange,  so  prominent  from  Colonial  times, 
slowly  disappeared  and  was  replaced  by  the  promis- 
sory  note  as  the  most  common  credit  instrument,  a 
transition  largely  completed  by  the  end  of  the  Civil 
War.  Through  use  of  the  promissory  note  on  a  basis 
of continuous  renewals,  banks  were  able  to conform  to 
the  letter  of  the  law,  as  far  as  theory  was  concerned, 
and  still  meet  the  long-term  credit  demands  of  busi- 
ness.  By  informally  guaranteeing  renewal  of  short- 
term  notes,  banks  in  effect  began  granting  loan  com- 
mitments  for  long-term  credits  to  their  customers. 
So  completely  did  the  short-term  promissory  note 
fulfill  the  various  credit  demands  of  business  through 
repeated  extensions  that  it  came  to  be  regarded  as 
accommodation  paper,  to  be  used  for  general  credit 
needs  and  not  exclusively  for  self-liquidating  com- 
mercial  transactions.6  Starting  in  the  1870’s,  this 
practice  became  more  overt  as  banks  began  to  rely 
on  financial  statement  analysis  as  a  basis  for  mak:ing 
advances.  The  use  of  loan  proceeds  was  left  more 
and  more  to  the  discretion  of  business  customers 
who,  upon  examination,  were  found  to  be  financially 
sound.  The  earliest  analysis  of  the  uses  of  short- 
term,  unsecured  bank  loans,  made  for  the  several 
years  immediately  preceding  1918,  places  at  20  per- 
cent  the  proportion  used  for  investment  in  fixed 
capital.’  The  same  source  estimates  that  between 
40  and  50  percent  of  short-term,  unsecured  loans 
made  at  banks  in  large  cities  were  commonly  renewed 
at  maturity.”  This,  it  seems,  was  the  state  of  affairs 
that  existed  prior  to  1920,  the  beginning  of  the  next 
major  period  of  evolutionary  change  in  banking. 
The  commercial  loan  theory  of  credit  became  ob- 
solete  both  because  of  its  conceptual  flaws  and  its 
impracticality.  A  critical  underlying  assumption  of 
the  theory  held  that  short-term  commercial  loans 
were  desirable  because  they  would  be  repaid  with 
income  resulting  from  the  commercial  transa.ction 
financed  by  the  loan.  It  was  realized  that  this  as- 
sumption  would  certainly  not  hold  during  a  general 
financial  crisis  even  if  bank  loan  portfolios  did  con- 
form  to  theoretical  standards,  for  in  most  commercial 
transactions  the  purchaser  of  goods  sold  by  the 
original  borrower  had  to  depend  to  a  significant  ex- 
tent  on  bank  credit.  Without  continued  general  credit 
availability,  therefore,  even  short-term  loans  backing 
transactions  involving  real  goods  would  turn  illiquid. 
Rigid  adherence  to  the  orthodox  doctrine  was,  fur- 
thermore,  a  practical  impossibility  if  banks  were  to 
play  a  role  in  the  nation’s  economic  development. 
Moreover,  the  practice  of  continually  renewing  short- 
term  notes  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  long-term 
capital  projects  proved  unacceptable.  The  faihne  or 
inability  of  banks  to  tailor  loan  arrangements  to  the 
specific  conditions  encountered  with  longer-term  uses 
in  fact  contributed  to  the  demise  of  the  practice.  By 
the  1920’s  these  factors  became  strong  enough  to 
work  a  change  in  basic  banking  doctrine. 
The  Shiftability  Theory  and  the  Doctrine  of 
Anticipated  Income  The  shiftability  theory  of 
liquidity  replaced  the  commercial  loan  theory  of 
BHar~  33.  Miller.  Bankilag Thcwies  in  the  United  Statis  Before 
1860.  Cambridrw  Harvard  Universim  Press.  1927.  p.  179.. 
‘H.  G.  Moulton,  “Commercial  Banking  and  Capital  Formation, 
Part  II,”  The Journal of  Political Economy,  Vol.  XXVI,  No.  6.  June 
1918,  648. 
SH.  G.  Moulton,  “Commercial  Banking  and  Capital  Formation. 
Part  III.”  The  .Joumal  of  Political  Economy.  Vol.  XXVI,  NO.  7. 
July  1918,  707. 
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the  late  1940’s,  when  it  was  supplemented  by  the 
doctrine  of  anticipated  income.  Formally  developed 
by  Harold  G,  Moulton  in  1915,  the  shiftability  theory 
held  that  banks  could  most  effectively  protect  them- 
selves  against  massive  deposit  withdrawals  by  hold- 
ing,  as  a  form  of  liquidity  reserve,  credit  instruments 
for  which  there  existed  a  ready  secondary  market.g 
Included  in  this  liquidity  reserve  were  commercial 
paper,  prime  bankers’  acceptances  and,  most  impor- 
tantly  as  it  turned  out,  Treasury  bills.  Under  normal 
conditions  all  these  instruments  met  the  tests  of  mar- 
ketability  and,  because  of  their  short  terms  to  ma- 
turity,  capital  certainty.  The  shiftability  theory  was 
enhanced  during  the  1930’s  and  1940’s  by  the  rapid 
growth  in  volume  of  short-term  U.  S.  Government 
obligations. 
Unlike  the  old  commercial  loan  theory  of  credit, 
the  shiftability  theory  provided  a  theoretical  frame- 
work  that  could  accommodate  new  and  innovative 
approaches  to  business  lending  by  commercial  banks. 
This  was  so  because  liquidity  meant  the  ability  to 
exchange  secondary  reserve  assets  for  cash,  an  ap- 
proach  that  relaxed  the  constraints  previously  placed 
on  loan  arrangements.  As  bank  holdings  of  U.  S. 
Government  securities  grew,  the  thrust  of  the  liquid- 
ity  question  was  increasingly  transferred  from  loan 
to  investment  portfolios.  Bank  lending  techniques 
changed  dramatically  against  this  background,  a 
process  that  was  stimulated  as  a  result  of  changes  in 
business  credit  demands  after  the  Great  Depression.r” 
It  is  under  the  shiftability  theory  of  liquidity  that 
commercial  bank  loan  commitment  practices  began 
to  assume  the  form  that  prevails  today. 
Perhaps  the  biggest  breakthrough  in  bank  lending 
during  this  period  was  explicit  recognition  of  the 
concept  of  term  lending,  a  change  that  signified  a 
clear  break  with  the  commercial  loan  theory  of credit. 
Term  lending  was  first  introduced  in  the  early  1930’s 
and  came  as  a  response  to  conditions  imposed  by  the 
Great  Depression.  The  tradition  of  making  and 
continuously  renewing  short-term  loans  for  what 
amounted  to  long-term  credit  needs  broke  down  in 
the  period  1929-1933.  One  result  was  a  purification 
of  the  concept  of  loan  commitments.  Henceforth, 
commitment  arrangements  would  more  realistically 
conform  to  the  intended  uses  of  credit,  a  much  im- 
v  Ibid.,  p.  123. 
‘@The  change  in  debt  financing  techniques  over  the  period  1920- 
1940,  especially  with  regard  to  bank  lending,  has  heen  described as  4‘  .  .  .  a  technical  revolution  as  far-reaching  in  its  significance  as 
technical  advances  in  industrial  production,  transportation  0~  agri- 
culture.”  See  Neil  H.  Jseoby  and  Raymond  J.  Saulnier,  Business 
Fimmce  and Banking,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  E.  L. 
Hildreth  and  Company,  1947,  p.  139. 
proved  situation  that  would  contribute  to  their  use- 
fulness  and  respectability.lr 
Even  though  many  short-term  loans  were  extended 
with  the  understanding  that  they  would  be  used  for 
purposes  that  would  not  realistically  permit  repay- 
ment  of  principal  in  the  short  run,  some  banks  were 
forced  into  demanding  repayment  as  a  result  of  runs 
on  their  deposits.  These  demands  for  repayment 
occurred  at  a  time  of  depressed  business  conditions 
and  general  financial  difficulty  and  resulted  in  a 
number  of  business  bankruptcies.  The  unfortunate 
lessons  learned  from  this  set  of circumstances  led  to  a 
more  realistic  consideration  of  the  need  for  a  true 
long-term  bank  credit  instrument.  Additionally,  the 
post-Depression  years  found  many  industrial  firms 
with  outdated  and  deteriorated  plant  and  equipment, 
renovation  of  which  increased  the  demand  for  long- 
term  credit.  Acquisition  of  funds  through  debt  and 
equity  capital  offerings  was  discouraged  by  the  high 
yields  on  such  issues  relative  to  the  prime  rate  on 
bank  loans  and  by  the  restrictive  provisions  of  the 
Securities  Act  of  1933  and  the  Securities  Exchange 
Act  of  1934.r2  In  the  business  revival  that  began  in 
1932,  therefore,  banks  represented  a  preferred  source 
of long-term  credit,  and  the  need  for  a lending  instru- 
ment  to  accommodate  these  demands  was  that  much 
greater. 
Acceptance  of  the  term  loan  by  bank  regulatory 
authorities  was  not  long  in  coming.  Two  events  in 
particular  gave  the  new  practice  an  official  air  of 
respectability.  The  first  was  an  amendment  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  through  the  Banking  Act  of 
1935,  by  which  banks  were  extended  the  privilege  of 
borrowing  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  against 
the  security  of  nny  sound  asset  acceptable  to  the 
Reserve  Bank  at  a  penalty  rate  of  one-half  of  one 
percent  per  annum  higher  than  the  highest  discount 
rate  in  effect  on  eligible  paper.r3  Prior  to  this  amend- 
ment,  this  privilege  was  available  for  use  only  in 
“exceptional  and  exigent  circumstances”  when  a 
member  bank’s  supply  of assets  eligible  for  rediscount 
was  exhausted.  This  amendment  extended  the  scope 
of the  shiftability  theory  by  allowing  long-term  assets, 
I1  An  argument  that  continuous  borrowins  for  capital  investment 
purposes  remained  prevalent  at  least  through  1955  is  made  in 
“Continuous  Borrowing  Through  ‘Short-Term’  Bank  Loans.”  Busi- 
ness Review.  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland.  September  1956, 
6-13.  This  thesis seems unlikely given  the  strong  acceptance  of  term 
lending.  While  there  is  no  doubt that  continuous business indebted- 
ness  was  and  still  is  common,  it  can  more  easily  be  explained  in 
terms  of  separate  borrowings  for  distinct  short-term  credit  uses. 
Commercial  loan  officers  do  encounter  situations  where  short-term 
loan  funds  are  channeled  into  longer-term  uses,  but  these  are 
generally  unintended exceptions  to  the  general  norm. 
1s  A  good  synopsis  of  these  background  conditions  is  provided  in 
George  S.  Moore,  “Term  Loans  and  Interim  Financing,”  in  Ben- 
jamin  H.  Beckhart,  fed.).  Business Loans  of  American  Commercial 
Banks, New  York:  The  Ronald  Press  Company,  1959,  pp.  210-11. 
I* Federal  Reserve  Act  8 10(b).  12  U.S.C.  g 34713, as  amended  by 
p 204  of  the  Banking  Act  of  1935  (49  Stat.  705). 
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advances  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  The 
second  event  was  the  1938  change  in  bank  examina- 
tion  standards  that  abandoned  the  “slow”  classifica- 
tion  for  bank  assets  based  solely  on  maturity  cri- 
teria.14  This  examining  change  recognized  the  fact 
that  banks  had  to  substitute  new  forms  of  loans  for 
their  lost  volume  of  short-term  commercial  loans  and 
emphasized  intrinsic  soundness  rather  than  liquidity 
through  quick  maturity. 
The  results  of  a  bank  term  loan  survey  conducted 
in  1941  reveal  that  term  lending  grew  rapidly  in  the 
1930’s  and  represented  an  important  part  of  total 
loan  vo1ume.l”  Eighty-one  of  99  respondent  banks, 
most  of  which  were  large  institutions,  held  significant 
amounts  of  term  credit  at  mid-year  1941;  for  50  of 
these  banks,  term  loans  constituted  22  percent  of 
total  loans  and  discounts.  Historical  data  provided 
by  56  of  the  banks  revealed  that  their  outstanding 
term  loans  increased  three  and  one-half  times  from 
1935  to  1940,  reaching  a  level  of  $967  million.  It 
appears,  however,  that  direct  term  loan  commitments 
were  not  employed  to  a  very  significant  degree  in  the 
1930’s  and  1940’s.  Term  loan  commitment  arrange- 
ments  were  available  under  the  name  of  call  credits, 
for  which  standby  fees  were  charged.16 
The  revolving  credit  also  appeared  about  the  same 
time  as  the  term  loan  and  probably  originated  as  part 
of  the  new  long-term  lending  arrangement.  Early 
discussions  treat  the  revolving  credit  as  a  form  of 
term  lending  because  of  its  multi-year  contractual 
nature,  even  when  the  term  loan  option  is  not  part 
of  the  arrangement.  Nevertheless  it  is  significant 
that  the  revolving  credit  did  appear,  for  it  represents 
another  advance  in  financial  technique.  Early  usage 
of  revolving  credits  was  very  limited,  their  number 
being  estimated  as  only  5  percent  of  the  number  of 
term  loans  outstanding  in  1941.“’  There  appears  to 
have  been  some  resistance  on  the  part  of  banks  to 
enter  revolving  credit  arrangements,  presumably 
due  to  the  uncertainties  involved  with  credit  usage. 
After  1947  an  interest  escalator  provision  based  on 
the  Federal  Reserve  discount  rate  in  the  district 
where  the  loan  was  made  was  usually  included  to 
help  mitigate  interest  rate  uncertainties.‘* 
14  Board of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve  System,  Annual  Report, 
19.38,  pp.  37-8. 
IsNeil  H.  Jacoby  and  Raymond  J.  Saulnier,  Term.  Lend&g  to 
Btiness,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  Camden:  The 
Haddon  Craftsmen  Inc.,  1942,  pp.  135-40. 
16  Herbert  V.  Prochnow,  Term  Loans  and  Theories  of  Bank  Liquid- 
itv.  New  York:  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1949.  pp.  25-6. 
17  Jacoby  and  Saulnier.  Term  Lending  to  Business. p.  77. 
1s Herbert  V.  Prochnow.  Term  Loans  and  Theories  of  Bask  Liquid- 
ity,  P.  25. 
A  major  defect  was  discovered  in  the  shiftability 
theory  similar  to  the  one  that  led  to  abandonment  of 
the  commercial  loan  theory  of  credit,  namely  that  in 
times  of  general  crisis  the  effectiveness  of  seconclary 
reserve  assets  as  a  source  of  liquidity  vanishes  for 
lack  of  a  market.  The  role  of  the  central  bank  as 
lender  of  last  resort  gained  new  prominence,  espe- 
cially  in  view  of  the  changes  of  1935  that  broadened 
its  potential  role,  and  ultimately  liquidity  was  per- 
ceived  to  rest  outside  the  banking  system.  Further- 
more,  the  soundness  of the  banking  system  came  t.o be 
identified  more  closely  with  the  state  of  health  of  the 
rest  of  the  economy,  since  business  conditions  had  a 
direct  influence  on  the  cash  flows,  and  thus  the  re- 
payment  capabilities,  of  bank  borrowers.  The  shift- 
ability  theory  survived  these  realizations  under  a 
modified  form  that  included  the  idea  of  ultimate  li- 
quidity  in  bank  loans  resting  with  shiftability  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Banks.  Under  this  institutional 
scheme,  the  liquidity  concerns  of  banks  were  partially 
returned  to  the  loan  portfolio,  where  maintenance.of 
quality  assets  that  could  meet  the  test  of  intrinsic 
soundness  was  paramount.  The  doctrine  of  antici- 
pated  income,  as  formalized  by  Herbert  V.  Proch- 
now  in  1949,  embodied  these  ideas  and  equate:d  in- 
trinsic  soundness  of  term  loans,  which  were  of  grow- 
ing  importance,  with  appropriate  repayment  sched- 
ules  adapted  to  the  anticipated  income  or  cash  flow 
of  the  borrower.*9 
The  credit  demands  of  business  were  well  accom- 
modated  under  this  system  of  banking  policy,  and  the 
use  of  loan  commitments  was  freely  pursued  into  the 
1950’s.  This  is  shown  in  the  Survey  of  hlember 
Bank  Loans  for  Commercial  and  Industrial  Purposes, 
conducted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  System  as  of  Oc- 
tober  5,  1955,  which  found  that  56  percent  of  the 
2,000  participating  banks  extended  lines  of  credit.20 
In  this  survey  virtually  all  banks  with  deposits  of 
$100  million  and  over  extended  credit  lines  as  did 
38  percent  of  the  banks  with  less  than  $20  million  in 
deposits.  Changing  economic  conditions,  however, 
placed  extra  demands  on  the  banking  system  that 
resulted  in  a  new  approach  to  balance  sheet  manage- 
ment,  and  businesses  faced  new  financial  challenges  as 
the  1960’s  progressed.  Under  this  emerging  state  of 
affairs,  bank  loan  commitment  policies  would  come  to 
play  a  more  important  part  in  the  credit  process. 
Liabilities  Management  This  country  entered  a 
sustained  period  of  rapid  credit  expansion  in  the 
“‘Ibid.,  P.  402. 
10  Caroline  H.  Cacle,  “Credit  Lines  and  Bfinimum  Balance  Reauim 
men&”  Federal Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol.  42, No.  6, June  1956,  573-9. 
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1970’s.  Banks  were  eager  to  participate  in  this 
process  and  share  in  the  profit  opportunities  that  it 
implied.  They  succeeded  but  only  by  radically  chang- 
ing  the  approach  to  liquidity  that  had  been  main- 
tained  from  the  earliest  days  of  banking.  From  the 
1780’s  through  the  1950’s,  banks  sought  to  assure 
their  liquidity  almost  exclusively  on  the  asset  side 
of  the  balance  sheet,  the  only  exception  being  occa- 
sional  borrowing  at  the  discount  window.  In  the 
1%0’s  they  turned  to  the  liability  side  of  the  balance 
sheet  on  a  massive  scale,  and  liabilities,  especially 
short-term  liabilities  in  nondeposit  form,  came  to  be 
viewed  as  completely  controllable.  This  approach, 
which  prevails  today,  is  known  as  the  liabilities  man- 
agement  theory  of  liquidity. 
Table  I  shows  the  extent  of  increases  in  credit 
from  the  1950’s  to the  1970’s,  along  with  the  changing 
importance  of  commercial  banks  in  supplying  this 
credit.  In  the  eight-year  period  1952-1959,  a  yearly 
average  of  $33.2  billion  was  raised  in  U.  S.  credit 
markets,  and  commercial  banks  provided  21  percent 
of  this  amount.  By  the  1970’s,  the  yearly  average  of 
funds  raised  increased  to  $148.6  billion,  of  which  41 
percent  was  supplied  by  the  banking  system.  Cor- 
porate  business  played  an  important  part  in  this 
credit  expansion,  its  yearly  average  increase  in  funds 
raised  moving  from  $8.0  billion  in  the  1950’s  to  $49.3 
billion  in  the  1970’s;  the  banking  system  advanced 
21  percent  of  these  funds  in  the  1950’s  and  34  percent 
in  the  1970’s. 
The  flow  of  funds  supplied  by  the  banking  system 
to  the  nonfinancial  business  sector  has  not  been 
smooth,  especially  since  the  late  1960’s.  Chart  1,  a 
plot  of  the  three-month  moving  average  of  growth 
rates  in  bank  business  loans  stated  at  annual  rates, 
illustrates  the  magnitude  and  frequency  of  swings  in 
bank  business  credit  since  1960  and  highlights  the 
instability  that  has  become  prevalent  in  the  last 
decade.  Since  the  mid-1960’s,  there  have  been  several 
major  swings  toward  tightness  that  have  been  in- 
duced  primarily  as  a  result  of restricted  credit  supply. 
These  episodes  have  had  an  important  expectational 
effect  on  the  behavior  of  businesses.  As  a  result  of 
these  episodes,  business  financial  managers  have  been 
encouraged  to  seek  protection  against  the  possibility 
of  recurring  periods  of tight  credit,  a behavioral  trend 
especially  noticeable  since  the  “credit  crunch”  of 
1966. 
In  1966  the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  measures  de- 
signed  to  restrict  the  rate  of  credit  creation,  which 
had  accelerated  rapidly  in  conjunction  with  business 
investment  spending  and  Government  espenditures 
Table  I 
TOTAL FUNDS  RAISED  IN  CREDIT  MARKETS*  AND 
FUNDS  SUPPLIED  BY  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
Average  Annual  Flows 
$  Billions 
All  Nonfinancial  Corporate 
Nonfinancial  Sectors  Business Sector 
Bank 
Funds  Bank  FlJIldS  Business 
Period  Advanced  Locms  Advanced  Loans  -  -  P 
1952-l 959  33.2  7.1  8.0  1.7 
1960-1969  64.4  22.3  19.8  6.1 
1970-  1974  148.6  61.4  49.3  16.8 
* Excluding  equities. 
source:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
Flow  of  Funds. 
for  the  Vietnam  War.  This  had  a  direct  impact  on 
commercial  banks  and,  through  them,  on  the  financial 
markets  in  general.  For  some  time  prior  to  1966, 
commercial  banks  had  been  restructuring  their  asset 
portfolios  to  include  more  higher-yielding  assets, 
especially  commercial  loans  and  municipal  bonds,  at 
the  expense  of  short-term  Government  securities. 
The  emphasis  on  commercial  lending,  depicted  in 
Chart  1  by  high  growth  rates  for  1965  and  the  first 
half  of  1966,  was  supported  by  sales  of  CD’s.  When 
the  yield  on  competing  money  market  instruments 
rose  above  the  5.5  percent  maximum  rate  on  new  CD 
issues  in  the  summer  of  1966,  the  Federal  Reserve, 
contrary  to  past  policy,  did  not  raise  Regulation  Q 
ceiling  rates.  With  this  source  of  loanable  funds 
effectively  cut  off,  banks  reacted  by  liquidating  their 
holdings  of  municipal  bonds.  Given  other  unfavor- 
able  conditions  in  the  municipal  bond  market,  this 
action  had  the  result  of  lowering  prices  dramatically, 
making  further  sales  impossible.  Banks  found  them- 
selves  with  no  other  choice  than  to  curtail  business 
lending,  and  credit  became  unobtainable  at  any  price 
-except  for  businesses  with  prearranged  loan  com- 
mitments.  If  any  doubts  about  the  possibility  of 
recurring  shortages  of  credit  persisted  after  1966,  a 
similar  experience  in  1969  certainly  acted  to  dispel 
them. 
It  is  no  coincidence  that  business  demands  for 
bank  loan  commitment  arrangements  surged  and 
reached  unprecedented  proportions  following  the 
tight  money  episodes  of  1966  and  1969,  for  these 
events  demonstrated  that  the  vigorous  use  of  mone- 
tary  policy  for  purposes  of  economic  stabilization 
could  result  in  severe  credit  shortages.  The  eager- 
ness  of  businesses  to  enter  into  loan  commitment 
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their  use  of  such  arrangements  during  tight  money 
periods,  is  clearly  attested  to  in  at  least  one  bank’s 
case  history.21  In  this  example  the  dollar  volume  of 
disclosed  lines  of  credit  rose  moderately  but  steadily 
from  mid-1960  to  mid-1966  and  then  leveled  off 
before  resuming  an  upward  trend  in  1969.  Total  firm 
commitments  trended  slightly  downward  from  1960 
through  early  1964  but  then  began  a  rapid  climb  that 
lasted  through  1966.  This  rapid  upward  trend  in 
total  firm  commitments  was  also  present  in  the  first 
half  of  1968  and  1969  before  falling  off  in  response  to 
an  internal  policy  designed  to  reduce  their  volume. 
While  the  ratio  of  borrowings  under  disclosed  lines 
of  credit  to  total  disclosed  lines  of  credit  showed  only 
modest  positive  changes  in  1966  and  1%9-1970,  the 
similar  ratio  for  firm  commitments  increased  remark- 
ably  in  response  to  tight  money.  In  the  eighteen- 
month  period  from  the  beginning  of  1965  to  the 
middle  of  1966,  the  ratio  of  total  borrowings  under 
firm  commitments  to  total  firm  commitments  in- 
creased  from  about  35  percent  to  over  55  percent;  in 
the  two  and  one-half  year  period  from  early  1968  to 
mid-1970,  the  ratio  increased  from  about  37  percent 
to  about  60  percent. 
It  appears  that  aggregate  demand  for  loan  com- 
mitments  continued  to  increase  rapidly  in  the  early 
1970’s.  The  results  of  a  sample  survey  of  large  com- 
mercial  banks  revealed  that  the  dollar  volume  of 
unused  loan  commitments  to  business  firms  increased 
by  68  percent  between  July  1970  and  July  1972.  The 
respective  percentage  increases  were  55,  45,  and  200 
for  confirmed  lines  of  credit,  revolving  credits,  and 
term  loans. 
Certain  alterations  in  Regulation  Q  implemented 
between  1970  and  1973  signaled  a change  in  emphasis 
for  monetary  policy  away  from  credit  availabil:ity  to- 
ward  the  price  rationing  mechanism.  By  removing 
interest  rate  ceilings  on  CD’s,  a  process  completed  in 
July  1973,  banks  were  provided  with  the  opportunity 
to  remain  active  competitors  for  funds  even  in periods 
of  rising  interest  rates.  This  basic  change  indicated 
to  business  borrowers  that  in  future  periods  of  tight 
money,  the  banking  system  would  have  the  freedom 
to  meet  their  credit  demands,  although  at  increased 
cost.  While  this  may  have  initially  reduced  the  per- 
ceived  need  of  businesses  for  loan  commitment  ar- 
u The  behavior  of  aggregate  firm  commitments  and  lines  of  credit  rangements,  it has  since  become  clear  that,  even  under 
at  Mellon  National  Bank  and  Trust  Company  over  the  period  1999- 
1972  is  described in  James  Ii.  Higgins,  “Loan  Commitments,”  The 
Joumd  of  Commercicrl Banh  Lending.  Vol.  54,  No.  11,  July  1974. 
2-9.  The  techniques  for  managing  lOan corn  mitments  presented  in 
this  new  set  of  ground  rules,  periods  may  still  occur 
that  find  banks  unable  to  fulfill  all  lousiness  credit 
thii  article  are  widely  considered  to  be  a  mo de1 for  other  banks  to 
follow.  demands  directed  to  them.  The  first  esample  of  this 
22  ECONOMIC  REVIEW, SEPTEM5ER/OCTOBER  1975 situation  occurred  in  the  summer  of  1974,  when  a 
two-tiered  market  for  regional  and  money  center 
bank  CD’s  developed,  which  made  it difficult  for  some 
banks  to  maintain  or  achieve  desired  liability  posi- 
tions.22 
It  appears,  then,  that  conditions  continue  to  exist 
that  make  loan  commitment  arrangements  desirable 
as  protection  against  periods  of  credit  stringency. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  the  willingness  of  banks 
to  enter  confidently  and  freely  into  such  arrange- 
ments  may  have  been  reduced  as  a  result  of  imper- 
fections  discovered  in  the  liabilities  management  con- 
cept  of  liquidity.  Given  their  adaptability  in  meeting 
many  types  of  special  business  financial  requirements 
throughout  the  history  of  U.  S.  banking,  there  is 
every  reason  to  suppose  that  banks  will  also  meet  the 
current-day  need  for  protection  of  credit  availability. 
The  current  mood  of  prudence  and  caution  will  hope- 
fully  act  to  keep  bank  compliance  with  such  demands 
within  a  range  that  can  be  reasonably  managed  under 
all  possible  financial  market  conditions. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
Commercial  banks  have  engaged  in  the  practice  of 
making  loan  commitments  to  business  enterprise  from 
the  beginning  of  modern  banking  in  the  United 
States.  Since  the  mid-1960’s,  however,  there  has 
been  a  significant  change  in  approach  to  loan  com- 
mitments  that  has  resulted  in  enlarged  demand  and 
liberalized  supply,  thus  increasing  contemporary  in- 
terest  in  the  topic.  This  article  traces  the  historical 
development  of  commercial  bank  loan  commitment 
policies  and  offers  an  explanation  for  their  recent 
increase  in  importance,  using  as  a  reference  frame- 
work  the  various  liquidity  theories  that  have  gov- 
erned  banking  conduct  in  the  U.  S. 
From  the  1780’s  through  the  1950’s,  commercial 
banks,  according  to  prescribed  theory,  insured  their 
liquidity  by  concentrating  on  asset  management. 
Under  the  commercial  loan  theory  of  credit,  the- 
oretical  restrictions  on  asset  composition  prevented 
banks  from  making  long-term  business  loans.  In- 
formal  renewals  of  short-term  loans,  implying  guar- 
antees  of  continuing  credit,  reconciled  theory  and  the 
necessity  to  meet  business  demands  for  longer-term 
credit.  Beginning  in  the  1920’s  with  the  shiftability 
theory  of  liquidity,  an  atmosphere  more  tolerant  of 
E The  financial  market  disturbances in  1974  involving  bank  liabilities 
solicitation  are  treated  in  “Banking  Developments  in  1974,”  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  Annual  Report.  1974,  p.  13. 
innovation  was  introduced  and  prevailed.  Term 
lending  began  in  1933  and  then  grew  rapidly,  one 
result  of  which  was  to  purge  loan  commitment  prac- 
tices  of  those  arrangements  whereby  continuously 
renewed  short-term  loans  supported  long-term  busi- 
ness  investment.  Term  loan  commitments  and  re- 
volving  credits  were  developed  in  this  period,  al- 
though  they  did  not  acquire  early  importance. 
The  liabilities  management  concept  of  liquidity 
became  prevalent  in  the  1960’s,  at  a  time  when 
aggregate  credit  demands  were  growing  rapidly  and 
as  financial  markets  showed  increasing  instability. 
Business  demands  for  loan  commitments  as  a  defense 
against  credit  shortages  increased  in  the  late  1960’s, 
especially  in  response  to  the  tight  money  episodes  of 
1966  and  1969,  and  were  accommodated  by  banks 
operating  under  the  liabilities  management  frame- 
work.  While  the  perceived  needs  of  businesses  for 
defensive  loan  commitment  arrangements  may  have 
moderated  between  1970  and  1973  as  a  result  of  the 
removal  of  the  ceilings  on  CD  yields,  the  experience 
of  restricted  CD  markets  and  credit  availability  in 
the  summer  of  1974  had  the  opposite  effect.  The 
general  conditions  that  encourage  demands  for  loan 
commitments  continue  to  prevail,  and  past  experience 
indicates  banks  will  aggressively  attempt  to  meet 
these  demands. 
The  legitimacy  of prudently  managed  loan  commit- 
ment  practices  cannot  be  disputed,  for  they  represent 
an  economically  useful  service.  Today  loan  commit- 
ments  are  especially  important  to businesses  as  a type 
of  hedge  against  financial  uncertainty.  It  does  seem, 
however,  that  commercial  banks  and  bank  regulatory 
authorities  should  modernize  their  thinking  to  keep 
up  with  contemporary  changes  in  the  use  of  loan 
commitments.  For  their  part,  banks  should  recognize 
that  loan  commitments  have  become  a  distinct  finan- 
cial  service  and  treat  these  arrangements  accordingly. 
This  includes  the  careful  monitoring  of  loan  commit- 
ment  positions  as  part  of the  overall  planning  process 
and  adoption  of  expanded  fee  schedules  that  fully 
cover  the  risk  exposure  connected  with  providing 
such  services.  Regulatory  authorities  should  make 
an  explicit  determination  of  what  constitutes  appro- 
priate  bank  involvement  in  the  commitments  area 
and  apply  these  standards  in the  examination  process. 
In  these  ways,  ambiguity  will  be  reduced,  and  some 
assurance  will  be  provided  that  loan  commitments 
will  not  occupy  the  position  of  a  potential  hazard  to 
the  banking  system’s  stability. 
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